China’s New Strategic Opportunity in Europe

President Vladimir Putin’s historic blunder in Ukraine has created a crisis in Europe that is costly for China but at the same time opens for it an opportunity for a new role in global politics. The costs are real and will continue to grow as long as the Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine continues. China’s tactical opportunity to contribute to mediation creates a strategic opportunity to move beyond the strategy of peaceful rise in a given international environment to one of providing key coordination in a post-hegemonic world.To get more China news, you can visit shine news official website.

In 2002, then-President Jiang Zemin announced that China was facing a “strategic opportunity” brought about by multipolarisation and globalisation, an opportunity that would last for twenty years. (1) China made good use of said opportunity, more than doubling its share of the global economy. But the 20-year window to which Jiang pointed also proved prescient. Both multipolarisation and globalisation appeared to be fading fast, and Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has closed that strategic opportunity. While China has vigorously criticised the “Cold War mentality” of the United States, Putin has returned Europe to familiar battle lines and battle cries.

The crisis will cost China dearly. More importantly, China has a vital interest in avoiding the slipping of Russia and Europe back into a Cold War configuration. However, China has reasons not to side with either party in the conflict. China cannot support Russia’s military invasion of a sovereign state or the response of comprehensive sanctions. Thus, China is interested in mediation, and its ties to both sides encourage that role. Moreover, successful involvement in resolving the crisis could position China well for a new strategic opportunity in a post-crisis environment.

The costs of crisis for China
Whether or not President Xi Jinping was told about Russia’s impending invasion when Putin came to the Olympics, he could not have been happy about it. The direct costs of the crisis, the disruption of China’s overseas interests and the risks of follow-on effects are all substantial. While Xi appreciated the 48-hour gap between the conclusion of the Olympics and the beginning of the invasion, it has complicated an already fragile year. China’s zero-Covid policy is increasingly out of step with global trends, China’s domestic economy is shaken by a real estate crisis, and Xi’s precedent-breaking attempt at a third term as China’s core leader will occur in October. The growth target of 5.5 percent announced at the National People’s Congress on 5 March is considered optimistic, and the announced domestic tasks are daunting. (2)

As the world’s largest trading nation and the largest trading partner of the European Union, Russia and Ukraine as well as 57 others, the direct costs of the crisis will be substantial. It is said that when China sneezes, the global economy catches a cold; but the corollary is that if the global economy catches a cold, China sneezes the loudest. A good deal of China’s high value and rapid shipment trade to Europe goes by rail, and the rail lines cross the battle zones. Last year, 15,000 trains travelled between China and Europe. Moreover, China is the major purchaser of Ukrainian corn and the world’s largest importer of oil. (3) Soaring energy and commodity prices add unanticipated burdens to China’s economy.

As the crisis continues, the disruptive effects on China’s external economic interests will mount. Uniting Eurasia was a major ambition of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. But a railroad that ends in Kazakhstan is less attractive than a railroad through Kazakhstan to Europe. More generally, if the two lean years caused by the global pandemic are followed by another downturn of indefinite duration, the debt financing of China’s numerous infrastructural projects will cause tensions with erstwhile friends. Meanwhile, the tasks of managing overseas involvement will continue to grow. The Belt and Road Initiative is already well past its honeymoon period; and with additional difficulties, a divorce is possible. The always tense relationship between Beijing and Taipei is another area of possible difficulties that could be exacerbated by crisis as “it is likely to reinforce China’s perspective on the seriousness with which [the US and Europe] would approach an infringement on Taiwan and in the unity that they’ve seen between [them].” (4)

The possibility of crisis escalation poses another dimension of risks for China. (5) If the intensity of destruction increases, NATO forces become directly involved or nuclear weapons are used, the current crisis could spiral into a realm of global disruption that exponentially increases its depth and length. China has had bitter experience with the long arm of sanctions against Iran, and outrage against Russia could encourage more efforts at economic decoupling. In any case, the crisis is already enhancing the vertical dimension of American alliances.